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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
FRED P. ADAMS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
CASE NO. 14281

vs.
FIRST STATE BANK,
Defendant-Appellant.
......,''....,,..

--00O00

*

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
00O00

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for the return of a boat, and personal
property wrongfully taken and for damages for the wrongful
taking and detention of the boat and personal property.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court granted plaintiff's Motion for partial
Summary judgment.

From a judgment for the plaintiff, defendant

appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the Summary Judgment.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent disagrees with the statement of facts
contained in the Appellant's Brief in practically every
aspect and therefore sets forth it's own statement of facts.
Fred p. Adams died unexpectedly on August 19, 1975,
(the same date as the minute entry of the lower court granting Summary judgment to plaintiff.)

It has been agreed

that the widow of the deceased, as Executrix of the Estate
of Fred p. Adams, deceased, may be substituted as the party
plaintiff for the remainder of the proceedings in this case.
All references in this Brief, as to plaintiff, however, will
be made to Fred p. Adams.
Fred p. Adams, hereinafter referred to as Adams, was
the sole owner and operator of a business known as Fasco which
sold special equipment for spraying fiber glass gel coats
and sold fiber glass reinforcement, gel coats, resins and
special equipment for the fiber glass industry.

Deseret

United, inc., hereinafter referred to as United, was a distributor or manufacturer's representative which was engaged
in the business of selling boats generally on a wholesale
basis to retain boat dealers.

United, for the most part,

sold boats manufactured by the defendant, Deseret Manufacturing, corporation, hereinafter referred to as Deseret Manufacturing.
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Lynn Nuffer and Steven Tapp were both officers and/or
directors and employees of the defendant Deseret Manufacturing.

Deseret Manufacturing was primarily a boat manufactur-

ing company which manufactured and sold various types of
fiber glass boats with the motors, power drives and associated
equipment installed.
Deseret Manufacturing had, for some time, been purchasing
fiber glass materials, etc., from Fasco.

On a number of

occasions, Deseret Manufacturing paid for the materials with
cash and on other occasions, they paid for the materials
with a check.

(Adams Deposition Pg. 6) A group of checks

given by Deseret Manufacturing to Adams were dishonored
by the bank all at once.

(Adams Deposition pgs. 6-7)

After demand had been made upon Deseret Manufacturing
by Adams to pay the checks, it was immediately agreed that
the total sum of the checks which had not been paid by the
bank would be allowed as a cash down payment on a boat to
be purchased by Adams from Deseret Manufacturing.
"A The second set of checks I do not have in my
possession. I turned them over to them as a cash
payment on the boat in question.
Q Well, you turned them over—you turned those checks
over to them as—in exchange for a boat, is that
right?
A in exchange for a down payment on a boat, yes.
Q When did you do that?
A On June the 6th." (Adams Deposition Pg. 7)

-3-
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At the time of the agreement of the exchange of the
checks for the down payment on a boat, Steven Tapp prepared
a "Dealer Order Form11 and signed it, showing that a boat,
model SF 22 00 was to be manufactured and delivered to Adams
as soon as possible and that of the total purchase price
due, the sum of $3,568.27, was to be allowed as the down
payment on the boat, which boat was to have been sold at
dealer's net price.

(Tapp Deposition Pgs. 6-7) A copy of

the Dealer's Order Form is attached to the deposition of
Steven Tapp and marked as Exhibit D-l.
It was further determined that at the time of the
purchase of the boat, whatever the price of the boat was,
that when the boat was delivered, Adams would either pay
the balance in cash or trade materials.

The discussion and

agreement took place at Deseret Manufacturing in Manti,
Utah. (Adams Deposition Pg. 9)
No further demands were made upon Deseret Manufacturing
by Adams for payment of the checks inasmuch as it was determined by Adams that they had, in fact, become a cash payment on
the boat to be manufactured for Adams as soon as possible.
(Adams Deposition pg. 10)
The boat was either being manufactured at the time of
the agreement, marked as Exhibit "P-l", or thereafter Deseret
Manufacturing started the construction of the boat to be sold
to Adams.
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On August 2nd, 1974, (two months later) Nuffer and
Tapp went to the First State Bank to borrow the sum of
$5,900.00 for Deseret Manufacturing, which sum they represented was the amount necessary to pick up some inboard motors which had been shipped to them for installation in boats they were manufacturing.

(Kunz Deposition

Pg. 4) Vernon Kunz, hereinafter referred to as Kunz, an
officer of the First State Bank, entered into an Agreement
whereby the bank would loan the sum of $5,900.00 to Deseret
Manufacturing and in return take a Financing Statement and
Security Agreement on the motors to be picked up and also on
several boats being manufactured.

(Kunz Deposition Pgs. 4-5)

The value of the motors alone was in the sum of approximately
$5,900.00.

The First State B^nk filed the Financing Statement

with the Secretary of State for the State of Utah on August 5,
1975, (R.102).

The Financing Statement and the Security Agree-

ment contained the Serial Numbers of the motors and the Serial
Numbers of several boats being manufactured.

(R.102)

The First State Bank or Deseret Manufacturing or both,
either made a mistake in the serial number

on the Security

Agreement relating to the boat being manufactured for Adams or
at no time did the First State Bank intend to take as Security
the said boat, but it is without dispute that the Financing
Statement filed by the First State Bank does not contain the
serial number of the Adams boat.

-5-
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The defendant alleges that the serial number of the
motor in the Adams boat was listed on the Financing Statement; but admits that it is shown as being installed in
another boat with a different serial number.

in other words,

the numbers on the motors and the boats did not correspond
on the Financing Statement and in no instance did the
Financing Statement or the Security Agreement reflect the
serial number of the Adams boat.

(Kunz Deposition pg. 10,

lines 7-10)
The Financing Statement and Security Agreement, copies
of which are attached to the deposition of Lynn Nuffer and
marked as Exhibit "D-l and D-3" show that the serial numbers
on the boats differ by only one digit and the remaining portion
of serial numbers are identical.

The serial numbers on the

motors differ by only one digit and the full number is missing from one motor designation.
An examination of the Financing Statement filed by the
bank shows the following descriptions:
#DMFA0085M75L, 1975 Seaflite 2200 Offshore, with
engine 2 55 Waukesha Motot #
WLDVSLI6-11821
#DMFA0082M75L,

1975 Seaflite 2200 Offshore, with
engine 255 Waukesha Motor #
WLDVSLI6-11824

#DMFA0080M75l, 1975 Seaflite 2200 Offshore, with
engine 255 Waukesha Motor #
WLDVSLI6
Subsequent to the date that the First State Bank filed the
Financing Statement, Nuffer and Tapp, brought the boat being

-6-
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manufactured for Adams to Salt Lake City, Adams became
aware the boat was in salt Lake City and examined it and
was advised by Nuffer and Tapp that Adams could not have
his boat; but instead, Deseret Manufacturing needed to sell
the boat to someone else to obtain additional cash.

(Adams

Deposition pgs. 21, 22 & 23)
After a considerable amount of heated discussion had
taken place, it was finally suggested that Adams could have
"his" boat if he would agree to advance additional cash to
Deseret Manufacturing.

Adams was to pay to Deseret Manufactur-

ing an additional $2,100.00 on the date of the delivery of
the boat.

in addition, Adams was to obtain loans from his

bank and advance approximately $6,500.00, in additional cash,
to Deseret Manufacturing so that Deseret Manufacturing could
pay off additional debts and obligations (Adams Deposition
Pg. 31) while they were attempting to sell boats through their
distributor, United, for cash.

(Adams Deposition pg. 20)

United was to guarantee re-payment of the additional loaned
funds to Adams.
Adams testified as follows:
"Q Well, why were you becoming involved in this
financially?
A Because they wouldn't let me have my boat unless
•

. . I .

. .

-7-
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agreed to finance another boat for them to get them
over their tough period." Adams Deposition Pg. 15
lines 12-15.
On the 14th day of August, 1974, Nuffer brought the
Adams boat to the parking lot at the Cottonwood Mall near
the Zions First National Bank, at which time, in the presence
of an officer of Zions First National Bank, the boat was delivered to Adams and Adams delivered a check to Deseret
Manufacturing in the sum of $2,100.00.

(Adams Deposition Pg.15)

At no time did Nuffer or Tapp tell Adams that the First
State Bank had a Security Agreement or Financing Statement
filed on the boat which they were delivering to Adams, if in
fact they thought they did.

(Adams Deposition Pg. 19 lines 23-

25)
Deseret Manufacturing demanded and received from Adams
the additional sum of $6,500.00. Although Deseret Manufacturing obtained from Adams the sum of approximately $8,600.00 in
cash, Deseret Manufacturing did not repay the loan at First
State Bank but used the funds for other purposes.
was due on August 15, 1976, but was not paid.

The loan

(Kunz Deposition

Pg. 6)
Several weeks after the boat had been delivered to Adams,
Nuffer and Tapp, called Kunz at the First State Bank and advised him that they knew where they could obtain possession of
one of the boats listed on the Financing Statement and Security
Agreement.

They asked whether or not First State Bank would
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like to have them repossess the boat or take possession of
the boat and deliver it to the First State Bank.

(Nuffer

Deposition Pgs. 32-35; Tapp Deposition Pgs. 18-2 0) Mr.
Kunz stated that he desired to discuss the matter with his
attorneys and then would contact them and let them know if it
would be alright. After a few hours, Mr. Kunz advised Nuffer
and Tapp that he had discussed the matter with Mr. chamberlain
and it was alright for them to take the boat from Adams and
return it to the First State Bank.

(Kunz Deposition Pgs. 7-10)

Nuffer and Tapp went to the residence of Adams and without warning or notice, took the boat out of the Adams' backyard and delivered it to the First State Bank.
tion pgs. 32-35)

(Nuffer Deposi-

(Tapp Deposition Pgs. 18-20)

When the boat was delivered to the bank, Kunz examined the
boat and discovered that the serial number on the boat did
not match the serial number on the financing statement and the
motor number did not correlate with boat serial number as
shown on the Financing Statement.

(Kunz Deposition Pgs. 9-10)

Adams was unaware of the conduct of Nuffer, Tapp and Kunz
and believed that his boat had been stolen and reported it to
the Salt Lake County Sheriff. After the Salt Lake County
Sheriff checked the matter, he discovered that the boat had *
been taken by Nuffer and Tapp.

Subsequent to his discovery,

demand was made for the returni of the boat and the demand was
refused and the plaintiff brought legal action for the restoration of his boat and all the personal property which was in his
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boat which, without dispute, belonged to Adams and over which
no other party had right, title or authority.
Neither Nuffer nor Tapp make any claim to any right of
possession of the boat.
APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS IS NOT ACCURATE
Rule 75 (p) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires the respondent to specify the statement of facts contained in Appellant's Brief with which respondent disagrees.
Respondent takes issue with at least the following statements
of fact contained in Appellant's Brief and for the following
reasonss
I

••..'

"However, the Financing Statement described the engine
number of the boat with precise accuracy, viz: WLDVS-LI6-11821 (R.40; R.104)." Appellant's Brief Pg. 2.
R.40 and 104 do not support appellant's statement.
statement is misleading.

The

The testimony of Kunz, an officer

of the bank, shows the following:
"Q
A
Q
A

Did you crawl inside to determine whether the serial
number on the motor was the same as it was shown to
be with that same boat on your financing statement?
I think Mr. Nuffer read it to me as I remember it off
from my financing statement.
And I assume you discovered from that, the engine in
that particular boat is not the engine shown on the
financing statement?
This is correct." (Kunz Deposition Pg. 10, lines 2-10)
(Emphasis added)
II

"Deseret became substantially indebted to Adams, doing
business as FASCO, and attempted to pay him with checks
that did not clear the bank (R.3)." Appellant's Brief,
Pg. 3.
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This statement is misleading. Adams testified that he
did not allow balances to accumulate. The indebtedness
occurred as a result of the fact that several checks were
delivered to Adams at various times for the purchase of materials and were returned by the Bank unpaid all at once.
(Adams Deposition pgs. 6 & 7)

The statement of appellant in-

fers the checks were delivered to pay an outstanding account
balance.
>

III

"Some time after August 8, 1974, and considerably after
the bank had filed its Financing Statement, Deseret
issued an invoice to "FASCO" for the boat in question
as well as other boats (R.103)." Appellant's Brief, Pg.3
R.103, does not support appellant's statement.

R.102, is

a copy of the financing statement which shows on its face that
it was not recorded until 8/5/74, just four days before the
date of the invoice 8/8/74 (R.103.)
IV
"The deposition of Adams was taken and he could not
produce any invoice for the boat in question but did
exhibit the one appearing at R.103 saying that the
invoice on the boat in question was "like this"...
Deposition of Fred Adams, p. 18)". Appellant's Brief
Pg. 3.
This statement is inaccurate.

Page 18 of Adams Deposition

does not support this statement. A review of the Adam's Deposition shows that he was never asked to produce an "invoice"
for his boat.

During the Deposition, he was shown an "invoice"

on another boat which was delivered to him on a later date.
He was asked to identify the "invoice" and state what date that

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

invoice was delivered to him.
V
"The invoice at R.103 clearly indicates that the consideration which Adams or "PASCO" paid was an antecedent
indebtedness but that is not an issue before this Court."
Appellant's Brife, Pg. 4.
There is nothing on the face of R.103, which establishes
that the consideration was an antecedent debt.

Furthermore

R.103, is an invoice for a boat other than the one involved
in this dispute.
82M74L".

R.104, designates the Adams boat as "...

The invoice at R.103, is for an "...85M75L" boat.
VI

"The boat was received by Adams long after the Financing
Statement was filed (Adams Deposition p. 18)."
(Emphasis added)
Adams received his boat 9 days after the Financing Statement was filed.
1974 (R.102).

The Financing Statement was filed on August 5,

Adams took possession of the boat and paid

$2,100.00 additional cash on August 14, 1974.

(Adams De-

position, pg. 18)
VII
"There is one important direct conflict in the evidence
and therefore an issue of fact precluding summary judgment for Adams, as two witnesses whose depositions were
published and reviewed by the Trial Court in the Summary
judgment proceeding testified that both of the witnesses
advised Adams that First State Bank had a lien on the
boat. (Deposition of Lynn Nuffer, P. 14, lines 6 & 7;
P. 70, lines 20-25: Deposition of Steven Tapp, P. 11,
lines 8-10)." Appellant's Brief Pgs. 4-5.
Appellant filed a Motion for Summary judgment and its
Motion was heard on the same day as respondent's Motion for
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Summary judgment. At the trial court level, appellant quite
obviously did not argue to the court that a dispute in fact
precluded a Summary judgment from being awarded to either
party.
The minute entry of the court (R.90), demonstrates that
the court took both Motions under advisement at the same time.
The appellant cites portions of the Depositions of Nuffer
and Tapp to establish an alleged "issue" of fact. Appellant
has not made this a point of argument.

Respondent, there-

fore, will point out to the court that the portions cited will
not support appellant's contention.
The Deposition of Nuffer (pg. 14) does not say "he" told
Adams, it says*

"we told..."

sible in evidence.

Such a statement is not admis-

On the same page of the Deposition, (pg.14)

Nuffer contradicted himself and mistakenly referred to the
"DeNiro" note for $2,500.00 as the one at the First State Bank;
thereby demonstrating that Nuffer and Tapp had mistakenly
thought the DeNiro note was at the First State Bank. At page
70 in Nuffer's Deposition, he admitted there was no agreement
with Adams to use the payment of $2,000.00 to satisfy the First
State Bank. At page 86, Nuffer admitted that the $2,500.00
"DeNiro Note" was paid the same day he delivered the boat to
Adams, apparently with the money received from Adams.
in Nuffer's Deposition, he gave several different versions
of the same alleged conversation with Adams. Nuffer testified
"we" told Adams we needed the money:
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1. "To pay the bank before we could give him his boat."
(Pg. 70) Previously Nuffer admitted there was no
agreement with Adams to pay the money received to
the First State Bank. (Pg. 70)
2.

Had to have the money "That day to keep my men
working" to pay the payroll. (Pg. 70)

3.

Had to pay the "DeNiro" note at the bank in the sum
of $2,500.00. (pgs. 14-15) (Pg. 18)

4.

To pay our taxes.

5.

Did not need the money for payroll — needed it to
pay the bank. (Pgs. 43-44) Took the money and paid
the payroll. (Pgs. 43-44) We paid our men with the
money. (pg. 44)

6.

No agreement that we would use the money to pay the
First State Bank. (pg. 70) We had decided to use
the $6,500.00 which we received later from Adams to
pay the First State Bank. (Pg. 70, 72 & 73)

7.

Used the money obtained from Adams to pay our payroll.
(Pgs. 43-44) To make a payment on our building. (pg.
70) To pay the DeNiro Note at the bank. (Pgs. 85-86)
To pay our taxes. (Pgs. 14-15). Did not use the money
to pay the First State Bank. (Pg. 37 lines 23-25)

(Pgs. 14-15)

At page 2 0, line 22, the question was asked and the answer
given as follows:
"Q Now,
with
what
A This

see, I'm getting lost here. Are these conversations
somebody or is this just your own impression of
you thought you wanted to do?
is what we wanted to get the money for..."

The last answer made it clear Nuffer and Tapp were merely
relating what they "wanted" not what was said in conversation.
The Tapp Deposition disclosed that Tapp was only involved
in the first conversation between Nuffer, Tapp and Adams.
(Tapp Deposition Pg. 9, line 23; Pg. 12, line 25; and pg. 13,

-14-
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l i n e s 1-4)

Most of the Tapp testimony w:\r~ 'V-

Tapp Ires! i f:i ed ruihr

a f t e r Nuflo.

same type of testimony,
"taxes 1 ",
i»b it-JOtl

"payroll",
1i ,

to-w.it-

n.

Lulu n:o

-. L.- i.bMinony was t h e

deeded mom/> i c r

"Bank", Federals or 1 >i ] ] s"

Mlo. rhc-« 1 ",

(Tapp nep-

I I I

It would have been obvious to the Trial judge that neither
r»p f n'Jd Adams about: a so'oui* ] Ly interest at the

Nuffer

*irst State Bank,

Adams would not have agreed to pay $8,600.00

- cash to acquire a boat with a "lion11 on it rand with no agreement ' •••
receiver.

l

Nu I for oi Tapp to discharge the lien with the money
••

,

.•.,-.•
i

I <. i.so appears as though Nuffer: and Tapp wero personal ly
obligated to pay the note at the First State Bank.

(See the

Security Agreement attached to the Deposition of Lynn Nuffer.)
V1 11

' '

"When the Bank confronted officers of Deseret about the
wrongful disposal of the Bank's security, Deseret*s
Principal officers and stockholders, Lynn Nuffer and
Steven Tapp called First State Bank and asked if they
should pick up one boat and return it to their place of
business. They were instructed by the Bank to return the
Bank's security (Deposition of Steven Tapp, P. 18, 19;
Deposition of Lynn Nuffer, P. 33-35). The boat was picked up by Nuffer and Tapp and not by the Bank. (Deposition
of Lynn Nuffer, p, 34 and 35)." Appellant's Brief pg. 5
There is nothing in the record to support Lhis .statement.
' - Depositions of Nuffer (Pgs. 32-35), Tapp (Pgs, 18-20) and
Xunz (pgs, 7-10), make it clear that Nuffer and Tapp initiated
tl ie "repossession1 of the Adams boat, but only after the Bank
advised them to do so and told them they would not be held
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liable for their actions. Nuffer and Tapp took the boat
directly to the Bank.
Nuffer testified that the bank expected Deseret Manufacturing to dispose of the boats and to pay the bank with the money
received (Nuffer Deposition Pg. 38 lines 19-25 and pg. 39
lines 1-4)
IX
"(It should be noted parenthetically here that a secured
party has the statutory right to require the debtor to
assemble the collateral and make it available to the
secured party at a place to be designated by the secured
party (70A-9-503) after default.)" Appellant's Brief
Pg. 5.
Appellant fails to mention that Adams was not a debtor of
the First State Bank.
X
"First State Bank had taken judgment against Deseret
Manufacturing (R.ll). Appellant's Brief pg. 5.

Appellant is quoting from its own pleadings, and there
is nothing in the file to substantiate the allegations as
contained in the pleadings.

Furthermore, the statement of

Appellant infers that judgment was taken before possession
of the boat was obtained.

There is nothing in the record to

support that inference.
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ARGUMENT
" ' : ' ' "' "" '

POINT I

FAILED TO FILE A FINANCING
STATEMENT CONTAINING THE SERIAL NUMBER OF THE ADAMS
BOAT AND THEREFORE HAS NO VALID SECURITY INTEREST
IN THE BOAT SUPERIOR JV ADAMS.
THE FIRST STATE BANK

The ."rumit:c entry o4' the Trial Court (kJO> cciita.^xo the
following Janauacr-'"1. That because the financial (sic) statement filed by
the bank contained the description of three boats of
like description and serial numbers that varied from
each other by only one digit, the claimed, erroneous
serial number of plaintiff's boat included on that
statement was a fatal defect sufficient to defeat the
bank's security interest therein." (emphasis added)
It should first be noted that 1 ho

,

*,

evidence to establish that First State rsank .ntende.. o ^i<e
a security interest in the Adams boat,,
boat with the serial number shown on 1: h

* .-*r > •;-.%

' mother

- i-u-j. » i_,tement.

The Deposition of Kunz (Kunz Deposit: ioi\ pg. '

^ws

that he did not inspect the "boat or check the serial nunibexs,
"The1 Adams boat was at, least partially completed when
Kunz took the serial numbers.

Adams had paid $3,568,27 as a

cash down payment on the boai; two months 'before the bank li Led
Its financing statement,
tion)

(See Exhibit: attached to Tapp Deposi-

The boat was being manufactured pursuant to the instruc-

tion of Adams as set forth on the ilea lei; Order Form,

(see

Exhibit, attached to Tapp Deposition)
The Financing Statement filed by the bank" contained a List
of 3 identically <;h i-vrji'i".| boats.

1 7-

The only difference in the
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description of the boats was the serial number.

It was

impossible to differentiate between the three boats except
by reference to the serial numbers. The serial numbers
themselves differed by only one digit as follows:
#DMFA0085M75L, 1975 Seaflite 2200 Offshore, with
engine 255 Waukesha Motor #
WLDVSLI6-11821
#DMFA0082M75L,

1975 Seaflite 2200 Offshore, with
engine 2 55 Waukesha Motor #
WLDVSLI6-11824

#DMFA0080M75l, 1975 Seaflite 2200 Offshore, with
engine 255 Waukesha Motor #
WLDVSLI6
There may be another 10 or 15, or more, boats manufactured
by Deseret Manufacturing which would fit the above listed descriptions identically, except for a difference of one or two
digits in the serial numbers.
No one examining the Financing Statement filed by the
bank would be aware that the Adams boat was allegedly covered
by that statement.

To make matters worse, the serial number

of the motor shown after the serial number of the boat which
the bank claims is the Adams boat, is not the serial number
of the motor in the Adams boat.
The Utah Code Annotated, (1953) Section 70 A-9-110, requires that the description reasonably identify what is
described.
Under rules established prior to the Uniform commercial
Code in many jurisdictions, it was necessary to list the
serial number of an asset in order to create a valid lien
against that object.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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i n I. ho 1962 o f f i c i a l

T e x t of t h e Uniform c:x>ranic,\roial

Code under the "comment" section following Sec. 9-110, t h e
following statement is made:
"The requirement of description of collateral... is
evidentiary. T h e test of sufficiency of a description
* ' laid down b y this Section is that t h e description d o
the job assigned t o i t — t h a t it make possible t h e
identification of t h e thing described. Under this rule
Courts should refuse t o follow t h e holdings, often
found in the older chattel mortgage cases, that d e scriptions a r e insufficient unless they a r e of t h e most
exact and detailed nature, t h e so-cal] ed "serial number"
test, ,f

•

, •

While it is true that; the purpose of Miction 9-110 w a s
i'» f'uLjM -I rigid L'uIo# it is also true that section 9-1.10
requires a description which makes it possible t o identify
the thing deseri bed

•

" •.

.r

•• .• • • •

:

••

Where a Financing Statement is filed wh;ch differentiates
between objects or things only b y serial nuri
JOOU i

V " "F i IK» \ e n a J number is aiJ you c.rt

r^~y UIK > ;. *

lr<-

Wheu the serial number:- ': i u.ror • don* •-ral

scribe

P.J object,

nbjec^

* — \; by np|v o n e Jiqil , f hpn II

heroines essential to moot I ho i equirt;ine:u. o •. i the • n* tor.^
Commercial code Section 9-1L0, a s found in t h e Utah code
(1953) s^ol ion ' ()A-1»- 1 10.

Annotated

..

• ••'•

Tn the case of Yancey Brothers C o . v. nehco, inc., 108
Ga. A p p . 87 5, 134 n A<\ t 2d 8?fi (19641, 1
0-.M0 of the iniiluiiu ("oimiie r r i a J (ode,

court rovi^wod section
^e C^urt. stated t h e

following:
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"Merely stating an incorrect serial number will not
vitiate the contract if the key is there,... but,
when the incorrect serial number is eliminated here,
all that remains is the names of the parties..., the
date, and the fact that a No. 60 caterpillar scraper
was one of the subjects of the instrument. Under the
cases cited above, this would not be sufficient to
create a jury question as to constructive notice."
The court held the filing of the security interest was
invalid because of a faulty serial number description.
The appellant has cited several cases in its Brief which
it alleges are similar to the facts of the instant case. A
careful reading of the cases cited by appellant establish
that the facts in those cases are quite different from the
instant case and the holdings in those cases do not really
conflict with the holding in the Yancey case.
Appellant cites Still Associates v. Murphy, 267 N.E. 2d
217 (Mass. 1971).

in the Still case a used truck was sold by

a Lavoie to a Murphy without disclosing the "lien11 of Still
Associates, inc.

Lavoie was not in the business of manufactur-

ing trucks, had not manufactured this truck and the security
instrument did not list 3 trucks of identical description with
only serial numbers to differentiate the trucks and with 3
practically identical serial numbers. The instrument filed
apparently was the only instrument and described only the one
truck as a "1967 Dodge 6 Cyl. D-100 pickup serial # 1161702080."

inasmuch as there was only one truck described on the

instrument the court held a one-digit error would not be fatal.
It is also interesting to note that the model year of the truck
was also listed on the instrument.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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T h e court supported

i t s deci si oi 1 :i i 1 1I 1 e Sti 11 case b y

I:t le c a s e of N a t i o n a l Cash R e g i s t e r C o . ^;r. F i r e s t o n e

citing

& C o . , lnc_., 346 M a s s 2 5 5 (1 IJCC R e p 4 6 0 , 4 6 5 ) , whi ch cc nisi t r u e d s e c t i o i I 9 •- 4 0 2

i!

(5 ) w h :i • :: h p r o v i d e d

' (a ) f i i I a i I c :i :t I g s t a t e -

merit s u b s t a n t i a l l y c o m p l y i n g wi th t h e r e q u i r e m e n t

of t h i s

sect ion i s effect ive e v e n t h o u g h it con ta ins in i n o r e r r o r s
wi: ii ch a r e not s e r i o u s l y m i s l e a d i n g . "

(Emphasis a d d e d . )

T h e Still c a s e d o e s not a p p l y to t h e Instant c a s e b e c a u s e
o f t h e va s t f a c 11 :t a I d. :i f f e r €^ n c e a n d b e c a u s e t h e e r i: o i :i i l t h e
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priority
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filing
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Still
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<nrior by
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statement
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in
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which
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ed by the trial judge), it was stated by the court that the
one digit error - alone would not be fatal.
The Court did hold, however, that the original party
filing the financing statement did not have priority because
of its failure to examine the manufacturer's statement of
origin and thereby assure itself that the title to the car
would be issued in the name of "Lee Anderson".

Because the

financing statement was filed under the name of "James L.
Anderson" instead of "Lee Anderson" the filing was insufficient.
The court then reiterated the following rule as set forth:
"in Bankers investment Co. v. Humphrey, Okl., 369 P.2d 608:
"*** Where one of two innocent parties must suffer through
the act or negligence of a third party, the loss should
fall upon the one who by his conduct created the circumstances which enabled the third party to perpetrate the
wrong or cause the loss.""
The court then said:
"The quoted rule from Bankers, also called the doctrine of
estoppel by negligence and the "two innocent persons"
principle, is admittedly of equitable origin. Sec. 28
Am. jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver, § 62 and 27 Am. jur.
2d Equity, § 147. Under 12A O.S. 197, § 1-103, "***
the principles of *** equity, including ***. estoppel
*** shall supplement ***" the provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code unless displaced by particular provisions
of that Code.
We hold that the quoted rule from Bankers was properly
applied in this case."
The appellant's Brief alludes to a Girard case. That
case, Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank v. Warren Lepley Ford,
inc., 13 pa. D&C 2d 119 merely holds that the Uniform commercial
Code Section 9-110 removed the necessity of a serial number
-22Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

from the fi I ing :i :eqi :ij r e m e n t s .
It is therefore clear that there is 01 lly one case cited
b y appellant wlii ci i :i s approximately similar to the facts in
the :i nstai it c a s e .

That case, the Yancey c a s e , invol ved two

Caterpillar Scrapers, a

I D and a 2w Scraper,

Sale incorrect] y do si g rut <>d the

v

W

The B:i 1J of

S c r a p e r al t! ioi lgi i :i I: i; i ., =

the ] D which w a s actually delivered.

The decis3 on of the

Yancey case supports the position oi respondent and the d e ci ci 01 1 rendered by I 1K> I tin I tjouil,,

•- ,,^r ''"

The other cases cited b y appellant involve fact situations which are not similar and their holdings do mil roul
'n'illii I1

uh> iii L he Yancey c a s e ,

rt is also clear that the First Stste 3ank ritn->- -?:
intend tc fake a

"ecut'if. interest

1 > I "i

ul.aiu, Lt»af

not

1 1 "

negligently fulled to inspect the boats and/or copy the serial
numbers of the boats and motors correctly,
Thr* ban I h.ivin 1 tajJiMi in MI 1 1 I \u.
70 T^-y-lUi, Mtah code Annotated

1 equi rement *> ut" Section

(1953) and having negligently •

-it best

f-ailpd to file a fxnancutq sKitoment

i «uiit a 1 n 1 n.) t hi e

rorrort

»<«riaj numbers ol the boat and niotoi does not have a

veil 2 a security interest as against: A d a m s ,
The L n a i c:",r' •

••• -

!di

«•-•. ^ .

"because the financial (sic) statement filed b y the bank
contained the description of three b o a t s of like description and serial numbers that varied from each other by
only one digit, the claimed erroneous serial number of
plaintiff's boat included on that statement w a s a fatal
defect sufficient to defeat the b a n k ' s security interest
there in."
(R90) (Empha si s Added)
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CONCLUSION
Appellant cannot establish that the First State Bank
intended to take a "lien1 on the Adams boat.

At best, all

that can be said is it negligently failed to adequately
describe the Adams boat.

There may be another ten to twenty

boats which the First State Bank could claim fit the description contained in the financing statement except for a one or
two digit difference in the serial number.
The description was not sufficient as required by the
Utah code Annotated to create a valid security interest in
the First State Bank,
The only case cited by appellant with facts similar to
the instant case is the Yanoey case and it supports the position
of respondent.
Respondent therefore respectfully requests this Court
to sustain the decision of the Trial court judge and affirm
the partial Summary judgment awarded to plaintiff-Respondent
Adams.
Respectfully submitted,
jack L. Schoenhals
721 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

84101

Attorney for PlaintiffRespondent
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